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Abstract
This paper aims to investigate the choice of governance modes in Chinese family 
firms. For that purpose, we build a principal-agent model to conduct our analyses. 
There are two modes of governance that the owner of the family firm can choose 
from, either the relational governance or the professional governance. The choice 
of governance modes is embodied in managerial compensation under different 
contractual arrangements. Our theoretical analyses show that under some 
conditions it is optimal for the owner to choose the relational governance, while 
under other conditions it is optimal for the owner to adopt the professional 
governance. That is to say, the choice of governance modes is condition-dependent.
Key words: relational governance, professional governance, Chinese family firm, 
moral hazard
JEL classification: L20, M21, J33
1. Introduction
Family-owned firms are more common in emerging markets (Milana and Wang, 
2013). With the great development of Chinese economy, the professionalization of 
family firms becomes a major research concern in China. Many Chinese family firms 
make their efforts to adopt suitable governance modes by trial and error in order to 
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accommodate themselves to the changing domestic and international situations. At 
the primary stage, Chinese family firms rely heavily on the relational governance, 
which is embraced with emotions, obligations, and reciprocities between owners 
and managers. Relation (or guanxi in Chinese language) plays an important role in 
making the relational governance work well because relation itself can act as a tool to 
reduce the agents’ moral hazard and to promote the principals’ clan reputation. 
However, relational managers have innate drawbacks because their managerial 
abilities are oftentimes limited and insufficient. Although relational managers can 
do their work excellently under some circumstances, they have too many difficulties 
to cope with complex situations due to the fact that their capacities fall short of 
requirements. Thus, family firms often become involved in predicaments which 
impose restrictions on their further growth. According to Cheng (2014, p.157), 
“[A]lthough family firms operate in a wide range of industries, most are in 
industries that have enjoyed growth in recent years, such as petro-chemical, 
electronic, iron/steel mills, machinery, pharmaceutical, telecommunication, and real 
estate.” When Chinese family firms develop to a certain stage, owners are often 
forced to consider the possibility of the introduction of professional managers. 
Professional managers are greatly different from relational counterparts in two 
respects. Firstly, they are not tied up to the mutual relation with owners, and they 
often behave selfishly and do not care for the owners’ utility functions at all. 
Secondly, they are usually more able than relational counterparts in that they have 
received professional trainings. Owners have to make a tradeoff in order to maximize 
their utility functions. On the one hand, owners could adopt the relational governance, 
which have an advantage in in-group effects (or zijiren xiaoying in Chinese language). 
Some scholars also term it as “family involvement in management” (see e.g., Kim 
and Gao, 2013; Dou et al., 2014; Liang et al., 2014). On the other hand, the owners 
could adopt the professional governance, which implies that the hired managers are 
more able but with higher degree of moral hazard.
On the basis of important facts and empirical observations concerning Chinese family 
firms, this paper hypothesizes that under some conditions it is optimal for the owner 
to choose the relational governance, while under other conditions it is optimal for the 
owner to adopt the professional governance. That is, the choice of governance modes 
hinges upon the specific conditions. We will use the principal-agent model to prove 
our main hypotheses. This paper offers an applied theoretical investigation, not an 
empirical investigation, of Chinese family firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides literature review on 
the related works in this field. In Section 3, we conduct a theoretical analysis of the 
relational governance and the professional governance and compare the outcomes 
derived from the two different governance modes. In Section 4, we further discuss 
the main results in order to comprehend them more visually. Some concluding 
remarks are made in Section 5.
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2. Literature review
The choice of governance modes is embodied in managerial compensation under 
different contractual arrangements. According to Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010), 
there are two strands of literature which are related to our paper. The first strand 
of literature focuses on the optimal contracting (e. g., Holmstrom, 1979), and the 
second strand of literature concentrates on the managerial power (e. g., Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2003). On the basis of these two strands of literature, when the owner 
hires the manager to operate the family firm, he faces serious opportunistic 
problems on the part of the manager. In order to solve such problems, the owner has 
to find suitable institutional arrangements. 
There is a lot of literature exploring the related issues. Pi (2011b) highlighted the 
role of relational incentive mechanism in which the owner can pick out the optimal 
managerial compensation contract in order to better incentivize the relation-based 
manager. Zhang and Ma (2009) emphasized the importance of the relative strength 
of impetus factors (e.g., market imperatives and firm size) and impediment factors 
(e.g., cultural tradition and familism) in governance choices. Zhou et al. (2013) 
stressed the role of control-enhancing mechanisms, and their empirical analysis 
found that relational managers in general outperform professional managers. Kim 
and Gao (2013) showed that a firm’s family-longevity goals play an important role 
in determining business performance of different governance modes. Zhou et al. 
(2015) found that family ownership concentration and investor protection could 
be substitutable when managerial power remains in the family. Amit et al. (2015) 
showed institutional efficiency has an effect on the prevalence and performance of 
different governance modes.
This paper tries to answer the question of what determines the adoption of the 
relational governance or the professional governance. According to Zhang and 
Ma (2009, p. 120), “Addressing such a research question is likely to help us better 
understand the professionalization of family business in a setting different from the 
hitherto dominant perspective and context in the literature, and hopefully make a 
theoretical contribution to extend and enrich the mainstream literature of concern.” 
The Nobel Prize laureate Ronald Coase and his collaborator profoundly pointed out 
that incentives and relation are indispensible for the successful operation of Chinese 
family firms (Coase and Wang, 2010). Cai et al. (2013) provided strong evidence 
supporting that family ties are important in shaping the internal organization of 
Chinese family firms.
This paper provides a new perspective on the choice of governance modes in Chinese 
family firms. Specifically, we find some key influence factors which are left aside 
by the existing literature, and analyze the role of these factors through an improved 
principal-agent moral hazard framework. We conduct our analysis by using a formal 
theoretical model, while the existing studies (e.g., Zhang and Ma, 2009; Zhou et 
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al., 2013) usually used data to conduct the empirical analysis. Firstly, we use the 
relational manager’s uneasiness cost and degree of altruism, and the owner’s clan rent 
to depict the substantive characteristics of the relational governance. Secondly, we use 
a parameter related to the professional manager’s ability to describe the professional 
governance. Different governance modes signify different contractual choices, and 
different contractual choices imply different types of managers hired, and different 
types of managers hired mean different equilibrium outcomes.
3. Model of analysis
3.1. The basic set-up
In this section, we follow Laffont and Martimort’s (2002) analytical framework and 
Itoh’s (2004) behavioral contract approach. In a principal-agent game, the owner 
is a principal and the manager is an agent. It is assumed that both the owner and 
the manager are risk-neutral. If the manager exerts effort level e ∈ {0,1}, then 
the firm’s added-value will be V– with probability π(e), and V– with probability 
1 – π(e), where 0 ≤ π(e) ≤ 1. When the manager exerts no effort, his effort cost 
is Ψ0. When the manager exerts effort, his effort cost is Ψ1 = Ψ > 0. In this 
paper, Ψ is called the manager’s exertion cost. The subscripts 0 and 1 represent 
e = 0 and e = 1, respectively. The following mathematical definitions should be 
noted, π(1) = π1, π(0) = π0, Δπ = π1 – π0 > 0, ΔV = V
– – V– > 0. In order to make our 
analysis interesting, throughout the paper we assume that Ψ ≤ ΔπΔV. According to 
Δπ = π1 – π0 > 0 and ΔV = V
– – V– > 0, we can easily find that π1V
– + (1 – π1) V– ≥ ΔπΔV. 
So it is obvious that Ψ ≤ π1V
– + (1 – π1) V– .
There are two modes of governance that the owner of the family firm can choose 
from, either the relational governance or the professional governance. We suppose 
that both the relational governance and the professional governance adopt the 
share-based incentive contract to incentivize the manager. According to Pi (2011b), 
the owner of the family firm can choose an efficiency wage contract or a share-
based incentive contract to motivate the manager to work hard, where the efficiency 
wage contract can be seen as a relatively high-powered incentive arrangement and 
the share-based incentive contract can be considered as a relatively low-powered 
incentive arrangement. In this paper, in order to simplify our analyses, we adopt 
the “relatively low-powered” share-based incentive contract. This simplification 
is beneficial for us to find out the role of relatively low-powered incentive 
arrangement which is more widely used in practice and at the same time it is easy 
for us to obtain explicit solutions. 
Firstly, we consider the case of the relational governance. In this case, the owner 
gets 1 – α proportion of the firm’s added-value and the relational manager obtains 
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α proportion, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The relational manager has two characteristic marks 
that are greatly different from the professional counterpart. First, the relational 
manager’s utility function includes both his own income and his concern for 
the owner’s share, and λ is used to delineate the relational manager’s degree of 
altruism, where λ > 0. In order to make our analysis interesting, we assume that λ is 
sufficiently small. It is certain that λ can also be seen as the relational strength (or 
guanxi qiangdu in Chinese language). It should be noted that λ in the altruistic sense 
is borrowed from Becker (1976). Second, the relational manager’s psychological 
cost is ΨR0 when he does not exert effort, where 0 < ΨR0 < Ψ. In this paper, ΨR0 
can be seen as the relational manager’s uneasiness cost. The economic spirit of 
ΨR0 is borrowed from Pi (2011a, 2011b). Throughout the paper, the superscript R 
represents the relational governance, and the subscript 0 stands for e = 0. When the 
owner adopts the mode of the relational governance, he can obtain some kind of 
clan rent which comes from his relation management (or guanxi yunzuo in Chinese 
language) within the whole family (see Dou and Li, 2013). f is used to denote the 
clan rent, where f > 0. For example, the owner can arrange his family members in 
different positions inside the family firm, which can bring praise-based authority to 
him. Such clan rent is an additional benefit. Here, it should be noted that f is highly 
stressed by Yang (2009) and other Chinese scholars. 
Secondly, we consider the case of the professional governance. Although business 
professionalization has other feathers (see, e.g., Dekker et al., 2015), we adopt the 
traditional treatment that there exists a nonfamily manager. In this case, the owner 
obtains 1 – α proportion of the firm’s added-value and the professional manager 
obtains α proportion, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The professional manager’s utility function 
only includes his own income, and there is no psychological cost at all when the 
professional manager does not exert effort, i.e., ΨP0 = 0. Throughout the paper, the 
superscript P stands for the professional governance. The professional manager has 
a characteristic mark that is greatly different from the relational one. That is to say, 
the professional manager is more able than the relational manager (see Burkart et 
al., 2003). In this paper, we use s to depict the professional manager’s higher ability, 
where s > 1. It should be noted that s is highlighted by Carney (1998), Yang (2009), 
Bi (2010), Xie (2011) and others. There are two points that should be noted. Firstly, 
the role of the professional manager’s ability is embodied in changing the firm’s 
added-value from V– and V– to sV
– and sV–, respectively. Secondly, the professional 
manager is disciplined by the managerial labor market to some degree, which can 
ensure that the average ability of the professional manager is higher than that of the 
relational manager. 
It should be noted that ΨP0 = 0 < ΨR0 actually implies that “the family manager 
works harder than the professional manager because her interests are more aligned 
with those of the firm head” (see Cai et al., 2013).
Here, we can use Figure 1 to describe the above-mentioned modes of governance.
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The timing of the principal-agent game is as follows.
(i) At t = 1, the owner decides to choose the relational governance or the professional 
governance.
(ii) At t = 2, a relational manager or a professional manager is hired which depends 
on the owner’s choice of governance modes.
(iii) At t = 3, the hired manager chooses an effort, which is either 1 or 0.
(iv) At t = 4, the firm’s added-value is realized.
(v) At t = 5, the signed contract is enforced.
3.2. Relational governance
When it is under the relational governance, the principal will maximize his 
objective function subject to the relational manager’s relevant constraints.
In this case, the principal programming problem will be:
1 1max(1 )[ (1 ) ]V V fα α π π− + − +
s.t. 1 1 1 1[ (1 ) ] (1 )[ (1 ) ]V V V Vα π π λ α π π+ − − Ψ + − + −
0 0 0 0 0[ (1 ) ] (1 )[ (1 ) ]
RV V V Vα π π λ α π π≥ + − − Ψ + − + −   (1)
1 1 1 1[ (1 ) ] (1 )[ (1 ) ] 0V V V Vα π π λ α π π+ − − Ψ + − + − ≥   (2a)
0 0 0 0 0[ (1 ) ] (1 )[ (1 ) ] 0
RV V V Vα π π λ α π π+ − − Ψ + − + − ≥   (2b)
(1) and (2a, b) are the relational manager’s incentive compatibility and participation 
constraints, respectively. 
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Throughout this paper, the incentive compatibility constraint can ensure that the 
agent exerts high effort, and the participation constraint can ensure that the agent 
joins the activity.
It is obvious that 
0
1 1V V V(1 )
R
π π π
Ψ − Ψ Ψ≥
∆ ∆ + −  is equivalent to 
0
1 1 0 0V V V V(1 ) (1 )
R
π π π π
ΨΨ ≥
+ − + − , and that 
0
1 1V V V(1 )
R
π π π
Ψ − Ψ Ψ<
∆ ∆ + −  is equivalent 
to 
0
1 1 0 0V V V V(1 ) (1 )
R
π π π π
ΨΨ <
+ − + − .
Solving this programming problem, we obtain:
If  0 1 1
1 1
[ (1 ) ]





Ψ + −Ψ ≥
+ − − ∆ ∆







Ψ − Ψ − ∆ ∆=
− ∆ ∆  
(3)
If 0 1 1
1 1
[ (1 ) ]





Ψ + −Ψ <
+ − − ∆ ∆
, then * 1 1
1 1
[ (1 ) ]





Ψ − + −=
− + −  
(4)
If 0 1 1
1 1
[ (1 ) ]





Ψ + −Ψ ≥
+ − − ∆ ∆
, then the owner’s equilibrium utility will be:
 




V V VU f
V
λ π π π
π
+ ∆ ∆ − Ψ − Ψ + −= +
∆ ∆  
(5)
If  0 1 1
1 1
[ (1 ) ]





Ψ + −Ψ <
+ − − ∆ ∆
, then the owner’s equilibrium utility will be:
*
1 1= + + − − Ψ +(1 )[ (1 ) ]
R
OU V V fλ π π   (6)
The subscript O stands for the owner. The superscript R* stands for second-best 
state under the relational governance. αR* is the relational manager’s equilibrium 
proportion.
Through comparative statics, we can obtain Proposition 1.
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∂Ψ , irrespective of whether 
0 1 1
1 1
[ (1 ) ]
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[ (1 ) ]





Ψ + −Ψ <
+ − − ∆ ∆
.
Proof: When 0 1 1
1 1
[ (1 ) ]





Ψ + −Ψ ≥
+ − − ∆ ∆
, then from (5), we obtain:
*
1 1(1 ) 0
R
OU V Vπ π
λ























∂ + −= ≥
∂Ψ ∆ ∆
.
When 0 1 1
1 1
[ (1 ) ]





Ψ + −Ψ <
+ − − ∆ ∆
, then from (6), we obtain:
*
1 1(1 ) 0
R
OU V Vπ π
λ



















Proposition 1 implies that the owner’s equilibrium utility is strictly increasing in the 
relational manager’s degree of altruism and the owner’s clan rent, and at the same 
time weakly increasing in the manager’s uneasiness cost.
3.3. Professional governance
Similarly, when it is under the professional governance, the principal will maximize 
his objective function subject to the professional manager’s relevant constraints.
In this situation, the principal’s programming problem will be:
1 1max(1 )[ (1 ) ]sV sVα α π π− + −
s.t. 1 1 0 0[ (1 ) ] [ (1 ) ]sV sV sV sVα π π α π π+ − − Ψ ≥ + −   (7)
1 1[ (1 ) ] 0sV sVα π π+ − − Ψ ≥  (8)
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(7) and (8) are the professional manager’s incentive compatibility and participation 
constraints, respectively. In fact, there are three constraints that should be 
considered. Because the professional manager’s participation constraint when he 
exerts no effort (α(π0V
– + (1 – π0)V–) ≥ 0) is always satisfied, it can be neglected 
during the course of analyses.






∆ ∆   
(9)
The owner’s equilibrium utility will be:
 
* 1 1( )[ (1 ) ]P
O




∆ ∆ − Ψ + −=
∆ ∆  
(10)
The superscript P* stands for second-best state under the professional governance. 
αP* is the professional manager’s equilibrium proportion. 
Through comparative statics, we can obtain Proposition 2.









Proof: From (10), we obtain: 
*
1 1[ (1 ) ] 0
P
OU s V V
s
π π∂ = + − >
∂
. 
Proposition 2 implies that under the professional governance the owner’s 
equilibrium utility is strictly increasing in the professional manager’s ability.
3.4. A comparative analysis
In this subsection, we will conduct a comparative analysis between the outcomes 
under the relational governance and the professional governance. 
The owner’s tradeoff can be described by Figure 2, which shows that the owner 
needs to make a comparison between the benefits of the relational governance and 
the benefit of the professional governance. The owner’s choice depends on which 
governance mode brings more equilibrium utility to him. 
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The manager ’s uneasiness cost
The manager ’s higher ability
The owner’s clan rent
The manager’s degree of altruism
Source: Author’s concept
By comparison, it is easy for us to obtain the following two propositions. These 
two propositions are the main results of this paper, which constitute our main 
contributions. 
Proposition 3: When 0 1 1
1 1
[ (1 ) ]





Ψ + −Ψ ≥
+ − − ∆ ∆
, if 
≥ + + +0
1 1
1




∆ ∆ + −
, then it is optimal for the owner to choose the 
professional governance; if 0
1 1
1
π π π(1 )
R fs < + + +
∆ ∆ + −V V V
λ Ψ , then it is optimal 
for the owner to choose the relational governance.
Proof: When 0 1 1
1 1
[ (1 ) ]












V V V∆ ∆ + −
,
 
then from (5) and (10), we obtain: UR*O – UP*O ≤ 0.
When 0 1 1
1 1
[ (1 ) ]





Ψ + −Ψ ≥
+ − − ∆ ∆







V V V∆ ∆ + −
, then
 
from (5) and (10), we obtain: UR*O – UP*O > 0. 
From Proposition 3, we know that when the exertion cost is sufficiently large 
relative to the uneasiness cost, if the professional manager’s ability is big enough 
relative to the relational manager’s degree of altruism and the owner’s clan rent, 
then the owner tends to choose the professional governance; however, if the 
professional manager’s ability is small enough relative to the relational manager’s 
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degree of altruism and the owner’s clan rent, then the owner tends to choose the 
relational governance.
Proposition 4: When 0 1 1
1 1
[ (1 ) ]





Ψ + −Ψ <
+ − − ∆ ∆
, if 
1 1
1 1 1 1
[ (1 ) ]
1
[ (1 ) ] (1 )
V V V fs
V V V V V
π π πλ
π π π π π
Ψ + − − ∆ ∆≥ + + +
∆ ∆ + − + −
, then it is optimal for the 
owner to choose the professional governance; if 
1 1
1 1 1 1
[ (1 ) ]
1
[ (1 ) ] (1 )
V V V fs
V V V V V
π π πλ
π π π π π
Ψ + − − ∆ ∆< + + +
∆ ∆ + − + −
, then it is optimal for the 
owner to choose the relational governance.
Proof: When 0 1 1
1 1
[ (1 ) ]





Ψ + −Ψ <
+ − − ∆ ∆
, if 
1 1
1 1 1 1
[ (1 ) ]
1
[ (1 ) ] (1 )
V V V fs
V V V V V
π π πλ
π π π π π
Ψ + − − ∆ ∆≥ + + +
∆ ∆ + − + −
, then from (6) and (10), 
we obtain: UR*O – UP*O ≤ 0. 
When 0 1 1
1 1
Ψ + −[ (1 ) ]






+ − − ∆ ∆
, if 
1 1
1 1 1 1
[ (1 ) ]
1
∆ ∆ + −[ (1 ) ] (1 )
V V V fs
V V V V V
π π πλ
π π π π π
Ψ + − − ∆ ∆< + + +
+ −
, then from (6) and (10), 
we obtain: UR*O – UP*O > 0. 
From Proposition 4, we know that when the exertion cost is sufficiently small 
relative to the uneasiness cost, if the professional manager’s ability is big enough 
relative to the relational manager’s degree of altruism and the owner’s clan rent, 
then the owner tends to choose the professional governance; however, if the 
professional manager’s ability is small enough relative to the relational manager’s 
degree of altruism and the owner’s clan rent, then the owner tends to choose the 
relational governance. 
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4. Results and discussion
In this section, we will discuss the main results obtained in Subsection 3.4 in 
order to understand them more deeply and illustrate them more graphically. Our 
discussion could illustrate the meaning behind our main conclusion that the choice 
of governance modes is condition-dependent more clearly.
If we let Ψ+ denote 0 1 1
1 1
Ψ + −[ (1 ) ]






+ − − ∆ ∆
, Ψ– represent 
0 1 1
1 1
Ψ + −[ (1 ) ]






+ − − ∆ ∆








Ψ≥ + + +










Ψ< + + +
∆ ∆ + −
, s+2 stand for 
1 1
1 1 1 1
[ (1 ) ]
1
[ (1 ) ] (1 )
V V V fs
V V V V V
π π πλ
π π π π π
Ψ + − − ∆ ∆≥ + + +
∆ ∆ + − + −
, s–2 denote 
1 1
1 1 1 1
[ (1 ) ]
1
[ (1 ) ] (1 )
V V V fs
V V V V V
π π πλ
π π π π π
Ψ + − − ∆ ∆< + + +
∆ ∆ + − + −
, then Propositions 3-4 can 
be summarized by Table 1.
Table 1: The owner’s condition-dependent choice of governance modes
Governance mode Relational governance Professional governance
Condition Ψ
+ and s–1 Ψ+ and s+1
Ψ– and s–2 Ψ– and s+2
Source: Author’s calculations
From Table 1, it is easy for us to find that the comparison between the manager’s 
exertion cost and uneasiness cost plays a first-order role, and that the comparison 
between the professional manager’s ability and the relational manager’s degree of 
altruism and the owner’s clan rent plays a second-order role. That is to say, there 
is a subtle and dilemmatic contrast between reducing the professional manager’s 
moral hazard and enhancing the relational manager’s ability.
In order to enunciate more clearly, Table 1 can also be depicted by Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: The owner’s choice of governance modes
( )or fλ








According to above analyses, we can find the following: (i) as for the plane of  





V V Vπ π π
Ψ= + +
∆ ∆ + −
 or 
** 1 1
1 1 1 1
[ (1 ) ]
1
[ (1 ) ] (1 )
V V V fs
V V V V V
π π π
π π π π π
Ψ + − − ∆ ∆= + +
∆ ∆ + − + −
; and (ii) as for the plane of s 







∆ ∆  or 
** 1 1
1 1
[ (1 ) ]
1





Ψ + − − ∆ ∆= + +
∆ ∆ + −
. 









Ψ= + + +
∆ ∆ + −
 or 
1 1
1 1 1 1
[ (1 ) ]
1
[ (1 ) ] (1 )
V V V fs
V V V V V
π π πλ
π π π π π
Ψ + − − ∆ ∆= + + +
∆ ∆ + − + −
. 
Thus, above the black line, the owner had better choose the professional 
governance; and below the black line, the owner had better adopt the relational 
governance. Figure 3 can give us a better intuition of the basic tradeoffs and the 
internal mechanisms in this paper.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we mainly discuss the choice of governance modes in Chinese family 
firms. There are two modes of governance that the owner of the family firm can 
choose from, either the relational governance or the professional governance. 
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The choice of governance modes is embodied in managerial compensation under 
different contractual arrangements. Our hypotheses have been proved by our 
theoretical analyses. We find that under some conditions it is optimal for the owner 
to choose the relational governance, while under other conditions it is optimal for 
the owner to adopt the professional governance. In a word, the choice of governance 
modes is condition-dependent. Under the relational governance, the owner appoints 
the manager by favoritism, which is called “renrenweiqin” in Chinese language. 
Under the professional governance, the owner appoints the manager according 
to his ability, which is called “renrenweixian” in Chinese language. According to 
Propositions 3-4, Table 1 and Figure 3, it is obvious that the owner has to make a 
tradeoff on the choice of governance modes. As we know, the relational manager is 
with lower degree of moral hazard and lower level of ability, while the professional 
manager is with higher degree of moral hazard and higher level of ability. A Chinese 
proverb says, “Where there is a gain, there is a loss.” That is to say, the choice of 
governance modes is determined by the joint roles of many influencing factors that 
are mentioned by Figure 2. Here, we point out the matters needing attention of our 
main results. Firstly, although most people in China hold that Chinese family firms 
should adopt the professional governance in order to go with the tide of economic 
development, we find that the relational governance may be a better choice under 
some conditions. Secondly, different owners of Chinese family firms may put 
different weights on their clan rents and the relational managers’ degree of altruism, 
and this will affect the basic tradeoffs and the eventual choice of governance 
modes. That is to say, the owners’ role of subjective intentions cannot be neglected. 
However, many people unwittingly ignore such a role. Thirdly, the tradeoff between 
one agent’s loyalty (i.e., altruism in this paper’s sense) and another agent’s ability 
is not only a problem existing in Chinese family firms, but also a problem prevalent 
in some governments. Put differently, such a tradeoff is important in many fields. 
In the end, according to Cheng’s (2014, p.149) important literature review, “We 
call for more research to understand the unique family effects and encourage more 
research on Chinese family firms.” This paper just throws away a brick in order to 
get a gem.
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Istraživanje o izboru načina upravljanja u kineskim obiteljskim tvrtkama1
Jiancai Pi2
Sažetak
Ovaj rad ima za cilj istražiti izbor načina upravljanja u kineskim obiteljskim 
tvrtkama. U tu svrhu primijenjen je model nalogodavca -zastupnika za provođenje 
analize. Postoje dva načina upravljanja koji vlasnik obiteljske tvrtke može 
odabrati, relacijsko upravljanje ili profesionalno upravljanje. Izbor načina 
upravljanja temelji se na menadžerskoj kompenzaciji pod različitim ugovornim 
uvjetima. Naše teorijske analize pokazuju da je u nekim uvjetima optimalno da se 
vlasnik opredjeljuje za relacijsko upravljanje, dok pod drugim uvjetima, optimalan 
izbor je profesionalno upravljanje. Naime, izbor načina upravljanja ovisi o 
uvjetima. 
Ključne riječi: relacijsko upravljanje, profesionalno upravljanje, kineska obiteljska 
tvrtka, moralna opasnost
JEL klasifikacija: L20, M21, J33
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